When AI goes Awry

Des Higham
School of Mathematics
University of Edinburgh

EPSRC
Engineering and Physical Sciences
Research Council

Susceptibility of AI to perturbation

1. **Adversarial Attacks**, 2. **Inevitability Results**,
3. **Generative Diffusion Models**

- *On Adversarial Examples and Stealth Attacks in Artificial Intelligence Systems*, I. Y. Tyukin, D. J. Higham, A. N. Gorban, International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2020
- *Adversarial Ink: Componentwise Backward Error Attacks on Deep Learning*, L. Beerens, D. J. Higham, IMA J Applied Math., 2023
- *The Boundaries of Verifiable Accuracy, Robustness, and Generalisation in Deep Learning*, A. Bastounis, A. N. Gorban, A. C. Hansen, D. J. Higham, D. Prokhorov, O. J. Sutton, I. Y. Tyukin and Q. Zhou, Int, Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks, 2023
- *The Feasibility and Inevitability of Stealth Attacks*, I. Y. Tyukin, D. J. Higham, A. Bastounis, E. Woldegeorgis, A. N. Gorban, IMA J Applied Math., 2023
- *How Adversarial Attacks Can Disrupt Seemingly Stable Accurate Classifiers*, O. J. Sutton, Q. Zhou, I. Y. Tyukin, A. N. Gorban, A. Bastounis, D. J. Higham, arXiv: 2309.03665, 2023
- *Vulnerability Analysis of Transformer-based Optical Character Recognition to Adversarial Attacks*, L. Beerens, D. J. Higham, arXiv: 2311.17128, 2023
- *Stealth Edits for Provably Fixing or Attacking Large Language Models*, O. J. Sutton, Q. Zhou, W. Wang, D. J. Higham, A. N. Gorban, A. Bastounis, I. Y. Tyukin, arXiv: 2406.12670, 2023
- *Deceptive Diffusion: Generating Synthetic Adversarial Examples*, L. Beerens, C. F. Higham, D. J. Higham, arXiv:2406.19807, 2024

Adversarial Attack on a Classifier

Intriguing properties of neural networks, J. Bruna, Ch. Szegedy, I. Sutskever, I. J. Goodfellow, W. Zaremba, R. Fergus & D. Erhan, Int. Conf. on Learning Rep., 2014

See also:

Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples, I. J. Goodfellow, J. Shlens & Ch. Szegedy, Int. Conf. on Learning Rep., 2015

Adversarial Patches

Fooling automated surveillance cameras: adversarial patches to attack person detection,

S.Thys, W. Van Ranst, and T. Goedemé, arXiv 2019

See also:
Adversarial patch,

T. B. Brown, D. Mane, A. Roy, M. Abadi and J. Gilmer, arXiv 2017

Adversarial Spectacles

A General Framework for Adversarial Examples with Objectives,
M. Sharif, S. Bhagavatula, L. Bauer, M. K. Reiter, ACM Transactions on Privacy and Security, 2019

Attacking Explainable AI

Explanations can be manipulated and geometry is to blame,

A.-K. Dombrowski, M. Alber, C. J. Anders, M. Ackermann, K.-R. Müller, P. Kessel,

Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, 2019

MNIST: perturbed image classified as 8

Fully connected: one hidden layer of 100 neurons.
Tanh activation. After training: 97% accuracy.

Original



DeepFool

$$\frac{\|\Delta x\|_2}{\|x\|_2} = 0.125$$

Componentwise



$$\frac{\|\Delta x\|_2}{\|x\|_2} = 0.263$$

DeepFool: A Simple and Accurate Method to Fool Deep Neural Networks, S. Moosavi-Dezfooli, A. Fawzi, P. Frossard, IEEE CVPR, 2016

Adversarial Ink: Componentwise Backward Error Attacks on Deep Learning, L. Beerens, D. J. Higham, IMA J Applied Math., 2023

Extend to Optical Character Recognition

Vulnerability Analysis of Transformer-based Optical Character Recognition to Adversarial Attacks, L. Beerens, D. J. Higham, arXiv: 2311.17128, 2023

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

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

A robot may not injure a human being

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

A robot may not injure a human being

Attack perturbation, multiplied by ten

Attacked image



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

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

A robot may now injure a human being

Adversarial Attack on LLMs



Universal and transferable adversarial attacks on aligned language models, Andy Zou, Zifan Wang, J. Zico Kolter, Matt Fredrikson, arXiv: 2307.15043, 2023

Stealth edits for provably fixing or attacking large language models, O. J. Sutton, Q. Zhou, W. Wang, D. J. Higham, A. N. Gorban, A. Bastounis, I. Y. Tyukin, arXiv: 2406.12670, 2023

Defence versus Attack

Nicholas Carlini of Google Deep Mind:

A LLM assisted exploitation of AI-Guardian, arXiv: 2307.15008, 2023

"Historically, the vast majority of adversarial defenses published at top-tier conferences . . . are quickly broken."

". . . it typically requires just a few hours of work to break published defenses, and does not require developing new technical ideas."

And in his blog post series

https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing

" IEEE S&P 2024 (one of the top computer security conferences) has, again, accepted an adversarial example defense paper that is broken with simple attacks."

Regulation?

The Fallacy of AI Functionality, Deborah Inioluwa Raji, Elizabeth I. Kumar, Aaron Horowitz, Andrew Selbst, Proc. 2022 ACM Conf. on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency

European Union AI Act

Amendment of June 2023 to Article 15 – paragraph 4 – subparagraph 1 of the EU AI act requires that:
"High-risk AI systems shall be resilient as regards to attempts by unauthorised third parties to alter their use, behaviour, outputs or performance by exploiting the system vulnerabilities."

Can we design AI regulations that are **meaningful** and **mathematically viable**?

Inevitability & Success Likelihood

Are Adversarial Examples Inevitable?

A. Shafahi, W. R. Huang, C. Stude, S. Feizi and T. Goldstein

International Conference on Learning Representations, 2019

Uses the **isoperimetric inequality** to identify conditions where adversarial examples occur with probability close to one

The Mathematics of Adversarial Attacks in AI – Why Deep Learning is Unstable Despite the Existence of Stable Neural Networks

A. Bastounis, A. C. Hansen, V. Vlačić, arXiv:2109.06098, 2021

Training a classification network with a fixed architecture can yield a classifier that is **either inaccurate or unstable**

The Boundaries of Verifiable Accuracy, Robustness, and Generalisation in Deep Learning, A. Bastounis, A. N. Gorban, A. C. Hansen, D. J. Higham, D. Prokhorov, O. J. Sutton, I. Y. Tyukin and Q. Zhou, Int, Conf. on Artificial Neural Networks 2023.

There exist infinitely many pairs of arbitrarily close networks, with one network accurate & stable and the other **accurate but unstable**

Attacks on CIFAR-10 binary classification

$32 \times 32 \times 3 = 3072$ pixels per image. Pixel values in $[0, 1]$.
50K training images and 10K test images.
VGG-style convolutional network in Tensorflow.
94% average accuracy on test images.

Gradient: linearized $\|\cdot\|_2$ attack.
Random: best of 2000 uniform random perturbations.



Gradient



Random

Six Empirically Observed Features

- Classifiers can be **accurate**
- Existence of successful attacks seems **inevitable**
- Successful attacks can be **computed**
- Random perturbations are **much less effective**
- Successful perturbations are **universal across images**
- Also **universal across classifiers**

How Adversarial Attacks Can Disrupt Seemingly Stable Accurate Classifiers, O. J. Sutton, Q. Zhou, I. Y. Tyukin, A. N. Gorban, A. Bastounis, D. J. Higham, arXiv: 2309.03665, 2023
sets up and analyzes two simplified (but generalizable) settings that can be shown to **capture all six**

[Backed up by experiments]

Random Perturbations are Ineffective



Data point $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$. Linear separator at distance ϵ.

Susceptible to an attack of size ϵ. But, for a point **uniformly sampled** from the ball of radius $\delta \geq \epsilon$ around x, the **probability of a change of classification** is less than

$$\frac{1}{2}\left(1 - \frac{\epsilon^2}{\delta^2}\right)^{n/2}$$

Perturbing the Weights: Stealthily

On Adversarial Examples and Stealth Attacks in Artificial Intelligence Systems, I. Y. Tyukin, D. J. Higham, A. N. Gorban, International Joint Conference on Neural Networks, 2020

The Feasibility and Inevitability of Stealth Attacks, I. Y. Tyukin, D. J. Higham, A. Bastounis, E. Woldegeorgis, A. N. Gorban, IMA J Applied Math., 2023

Stealth Edits for Fixing or Attacking Large Language Models, O. J. Sutton, Q. Zhou, W. Wang, D. J. Higham, A. N. Gorban, A. Bastounis, I. Y. Tyukin, arXiv: next week

Motivation: could be conducted by **mischievous, corrupt, disgruntled or compromised individuals, or corporations**

Insight: Linear Separability

Result

Stochastic Separation Theorems, A. N. Gorban, I. Y. Tyukin, Neural Networks, 2017:
Given a **very large** number of i.i.d. samples in high dimension, with prob. close to 1 each sample is a **vertex of the overall convex hull**

E.g., in $\mathbb{R}^{100}$, 10^{13} independent samples in unit ball are linearly separable with prob. > 0.99

Useful for **fixing** AI systems, but also for **attacking** them

Insight: Network Pruning

To improve computational efficiency and storage requirements: extract a **sparse subnetwork** that produces similar output.

E.g. Proposition 6.2 in

The Modern Mathematics of Deep Learning,

J. Berner, P. Grohs, G. Kutyniok, P. Petersen, arXiv:2105.04026, 2021,

shows that for a two layer network with $d \geq 100$ neurons at each level and ReLU activations, it is possible to make **99% of the weights and biases zero** and reproduce the original network with L^2 error bounded by

$$\frac{15 \, \|\text{original weights}\|_1}{\sqrt{d}}$$

Our Stealth Attack Framework



Theory

A **successful** attack changes classification of the target image but has no effect on the output for the entire validation set.

We have an algorithm for **adding a neuron** which, under appropriate assumptions, has a probability of success bounded below by

$$1 - C\gamma^n,$$

where $0 < \gamma < 1$ and n is the data dimension.

Confirmed experimentally.

For **overwriting a neuron** we have an algorithm and experiments.

Generative Diffusion: forwards

Denoising diffusion probabilistic models, J. Ho, A. Jain, P. Abbeel, NeurIPS, 2020

Diffusion models for generative artificial intelligence: An introduction for applied mathematicians, C. F. Higham, D. J. Higham, P. Grindrod, arXiv:2312.14977, 2023



Generative Diffusion: backwards



Deceptive Diffusion

Deceptive Diffusion: Generating Synthetic Adversarial Examples, L. Beerens, C. F. Higham, D. J. Higham, arXiv:2406.19807, 2024



60,000 original, labelled, images. Untargeted PGDL2* generates approx. 52,000 successfully attacked images. Train diffusion model on attacked data, using original labels.

Aim is to build a model that takes a label *i* and **generates an image that looks like digit *i* but is misclassified.**

* *Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks*, A. Madry, A. Makelov, L. Schmidt, D. Tsipras, A. Vladu, ICLR, 2018

Confusion Matrices



After PGDL2 attack
86.5% success overall

From deceptive diffusion
93.6% success overall

PGDL2 versus Deceptive Diffusion

After PGDL2 attack

From deceptive diffusion

Attack a Proportion of the Training Data



Proof of Principle

Deceptive diffusion produces new adversarial examples:

- not associated with underlying “real” images
- can be generated at scale.

Could be used within **defence** strategies—can create **hard-to-find** adversarial training data.

Related ideas in

AdvDiffuser: Natural adversarial example synthesis with diffusion models, X. Chen, X. Gao, J. Zhao, K. Ye and C.-Z. Xu, IEEE/CVF, 2023

Deceptive diffusion reveals a **new vulnerability**: poisoned training data creates an **adversarial image generator**.

Lots of scope for further experiments. . . (e.g., using **targetted** and **adversarial ink** attacks).

Final thoughts

Stability issues in deep neural networks can arise through

- **high dimensional** data or decision space
- **massive over-parameterization**

also

- **low accuracy** floating point.

Generative AI provides an alternative to traditional gradient-based attack/defence algorithms.

Finding **conditions** under which instability arises may motivate useful **guidelines** and **defence strategies**.

To **regulate AI**, we must first **understand and quantify the limitations of AI**.